NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 96 | Number 6

Article 2

9-1-2018

Far From a "Dead Letter": The Contract Clause and
North Carolina Association of Educators v. State
Tommy Tobin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Tommy Tobin, Far From a "Dead Letter": The Contract Clause and North Carolina Association of Educators v. State, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 1681
(2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol96/iss6/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018)

FAR FROM A “DEAD LETTER”: THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE AND NORTH CAROLINA
ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS V. STATE*
TOMMY TOBIN**
The Contract Clause, which prohibits state interference with the
obligations of contracts, has fallen from its prior preeminence in
American jurisprudence. During early American history, in the
words of the Supreme Court, the Contract Clause “was perhaps
the strongest single constitutional check on state legislation.” In
1878, the Court declared that there “was no more important
provision in the federal Constitution” than the Contract Clause.
Yet, years later, the Contract Clause was so rarely invoked and of
such “negligible importance” that some argued that it may as
well have been “stricken from the Constitution.” For much of the
twentieth century, the Contract Clause was more of a historical
footnote than a prevailing argument.
A recent case in the Supreme Court of North Carolina
demonstrates the renewed prominence of the Contract Clause.
The case, North Carolina Association of Educators v. State,
concerned a challenge to a state statute that revoked career status
for teachers. The state supreme court struck down the state statute
on Contract Clause grounds.
Rather than a dead letter, the Contract Clause remains relevant in
modern times. This Article provides a concise overview of the
Contract Clause and an analysis of this recently decided North
Carolina case. The case and its treatment of the Contract Clause
present lessons for jurists and litigants in North Carolina and
across the country.

* © 2018 Tommy Tobin.
** J.D., Harvard Law School; M.P.P., Harvard Kennedy School. Tobin previously
served as Teaching Fellow in the Harvard Economics Department and as Instructor of
Law at the UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy. All views, errors, and
omissions are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
What the state giveth, so may the state taketh away? When it
comes to contracts with the states, the answer is no, due to the
Constitution’s Contract Clause.1 In relevant part, the Clause
forecloses the ability of states to “pass any . . . [l]aw impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”2 The Clause prohibits states from taking
actions that would retroactively interfere with obligations that arise
under contract.3
The Contract Clause was a response to considerable historical
need during America’s founding period. In Federalist No. 44, James
Madison noted that the “sober people of America” were “weary of
the fluctuating policy” of legislative interferences in cases affecting

1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
2. Id. For a definitive treatment of the Contract Clause from its origins to the
modern day, see generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2016).
3. Elmer W. Roller, The Impairment of Contract Obligations and Vested Rights, 6
MARQ. L. REV. 129, 129 (1922).
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personal rights.4 Madison argued that the Clause was a “constitutional
bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights.”5 In Chief
Justice John Marshall’s characterization, the state intrusion upon
contracts at the time of the founding “had become so great, so
alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and threaten
the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and
destroy the sanctity of private faith.”6
Chief Justice Marshall posited having all contracts subject to
legislative control would be untenable, for to do so would mean that
each contract would contain a condition that its obligations might be
discharged as the legislature prescribed.7 In Marshall’s reasoning,
states were “restrained from impairing the obligation of contracts, but
they furnish[ed] the remedy to enforce them, and administer[ed] that
remedy in tribunals constituted by themselves.”8 Put another way, if
there was no Contract Clause, states entering into contracts could
cancel the contract by edict while also setting the law by which
contracts disputes are adjudicated.9
This Article explores the Contract Clause within the context of a
recently decided Supreme Court of North Carolina case, North
Carolina Association of Educators v. State10 (“NCAE” or “NCAE v.
State”). The case resulted from State actions that had the effect of
eliminating tenure over time for public school teachers who had such
status and prohibiting those that did not from ever obtaining tenure,
or more technically termed, achieving “career status.”11 Ultimately,
the case was decided on Contract Clause grounds, with the state
supreme court ruling that the removal of career status for teachers
was unconstitutional and violative of the Contract Clause.12
The ruling in NCAE v. State demonstrates the continuing
relevance of the Contract Clause, which was once thought to be a
dead letter. Demonstrating that the Contract Clause is far from
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 229 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
5. Id.
6. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354–55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting) (discussing his concerns about a legislature’s power to change the “relative
situation of debtor and creditor,” which “had been used to such an excess by the state
legislatures”).
7. See id. at 339.
8. Id. at 350–51; see also JASON MRAZ, The Remedy (I Won’t Worry), on WAITING
FOR MY ROCKET TO COME (Elektra 2002) (“[Y]ou were born on the Fourth of July . . .
[A]nd what kind of God would serve this? We will cure this dirty old disease.”).
9. See Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 352–53 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
10. 368 N.C. 777, 786 S.E.2d 255 (2016).
11. Id. at 779, 786 S.E.2d at 257–58.
12. Id. at 792–93, 786 S.E.2d at 266.
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obsolete, the NCAE ruling presents powerful Contract Clause
argumentation that can shape the future of public employee tenure
across the country.13 While teacher tenure politics are controversial,
the constitutional questions involving the Contract Clause are salient
across various domains and contexts.14
Part One provides a concise overview of the Contract Clause and
the historical antecedents for the state supreme court’s decision in
NCAE v. State. Part Two explores the NCAE case in depth, from the
trial court opinion to that of the state supreme court, paying
particular attention to the jurists’ use of Contract Clause arguments.
Part Three considers public employment law principles generally.
Part Four reviews public employment law in North Carolina. Part
Five utilizes the framework of the NCAE case to analyze the case’s
and the Contract Clause’s potential applicability to other public
employees in North Carolina and around the country.
I. CONTRACT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: A BRIEF HISTORY
The Contract Clause was, for a time, one of the most heavily
litigated provisions of the Constitution.15 Until the late 1800s, no
other clause, apart from the Commerce Clause, was the subject of the
Supreme Court’s attention more than the Contract Clause.16 As one
example, the Supreme Court found that a corporate charter given to
Dartmouth College could not be modified by state law without the
express reservation of the power to modify that contract.17 According
to one estimate, the Clause had been considered by the Court in
approximately forty percent of its cases involving the validity of state
legislation prior to 1889.18 The Contract Clause was “the most widely
used protection of individual property rights against state regulation”

13. Tommy Tobin, N.C. Case May Change Teacher Tenure in U.S., CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Apr. 23, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article7338
2107.html [http://perma.cc/M9D9-KKST].
14. For example, the Supreme Court recently decided a case regarding the
applicability of the Contract Clause to a life insurance question. See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.
Ct. 1815, 1824–26 (2018) (holding that Minnesota’s retroactive application of a law
nullifying an ex-spouse’s beneficiary designation on a life-insurance policy does not violate
the Contract Clause).
15. James W. Ely, Jr., The Contract Clause During the Civil War and Reconstruction,
41 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 257, 272 (2016).
16. BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 91–92 (1938).
17. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819).
18. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 95.
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and was so successful that nearly half of the state laws challenged
under the Clause were declared invalid by the Court.19
In 1878, Justice William Strong wrote that there was “no more
important provision in the Federal Constitution than the one which
prohibits States from passing laws impairing the obligation of
contracts.”20 For Justice Strong, protecting the Contract Clause was
“one of the highest duties” of the Court so as “to take care the
prohibition shall neither be evaded nor frittered away.”21 Indeed, in
the words of a later Court, the Contract Clause “was perhaps the
strongest single constitutional check on state legislation during our
early years as a Nation.”22
Following the 1870s and the rise of due process theories rooted
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Contract Clause
experienced a considerable decline in both relevance and utility in
constitutional argumentation.23 The Contract Clause fell into disfavor
because the Due Process Clause had a far broader scope of
application.24 Courts wrestling with the Contract Clause had to
overcome its limitations, such as when individual contractual rights
faced countervailing pressures from states articulating their
“inalienable” police power.25 One of the limitations involved with the
application of the Contract Clause is the inherent tension between a
state’s abilities to regulate under their police powers, including
furnishing remedies, and the Clause’s prohibition on limitations
regarding the obligations of contract.26 In addition to this remediesobligations distinction, the Contract Clause was also limited in its
application to current contracts, not contracts that were contemplated
19. Janet Irene Levine, The Contract Clause: A Constitutional Basis for Invalidating
State Legislation, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927, 930 (1979) (quoting WRIGHT, supra note 16,
at 95).
20. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 448 (1878).
21. Id.
22. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978).
23. See Ely, supra note 15, at 272 (“[T]he decade of the 1870s constituted a high water
mark for the significance of the Contract Clause in constitutional history.”); Levine, supra
note 19, at 930–31.
24. Carlen A. Petersen, The Contract Clause: The Use of a Strict Standard of Review
for State Legislation That Impairs Private Contracts—Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 506 (1979). As noted by the Court itself, “the
Contract Clause receded into comparative desuetude with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and particularly with the development of the large body of jurisprudence
under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment in modern constitutional history.”
Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 241.
25. See Petersen, supra note 24, at 506.
26. See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200–01 (1819)
(discussing whether imprisonment for a debt was a remedy or obligation of the contract).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018)

1686

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

or possible in the future.27 Courts, going into the New Deal, needed to
square the constitutional grant of state police powers with the
Contract Clause’s restriction of those powers.
In 1934, Home Building & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell28 ushered in
another era of Contract Clause jurisprudence, aiming to balance the
competing interests of state power against the restrictions of the
Contract Clause. The Blaisdell Court attempted to bring balance to
the force of the Contract Clause:
Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be
consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of
that power. The reserved power cannot be construed so as to
destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to
destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must
be construed in harmony with each other.29
Subsequent courts have noted that Blaisdell stands for the
proposition that the prohibitions of the Contract Clause “must be
accommodated to the inherent police power of the State to safeguard
the vital interests of its people.”30 The Blaisdell decision was used
subsequently to provide for “lenient evaluation[s] of state legislation
that impair[ed] contracts.”31 Following Blaisdell, the Court came to
apply a loose test that balanced the means and ends of state action.
For example, the Court in City of El Paso v. Simmons32 deferred to
the “wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what
is and what is not necessary.”33 The Court has even gone so far as to
say that state police power is “an implied condition of every
contract,” which is “as much part of the contract as though it were
written into it” and that a “[s]tate’s exercise of its power enforces, and
does not impair, a contract.”34 The Court’s finding that the power of
the state “is not diminished because a private contract may be
affected” is demonstrative of the extent to which the balancing test
threatened to eviscerate the Contract Clause, tipping the balance in
favor of upholding the challenged action.35

27. Petersen, supra note 24, at 505; see also WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 28.
28. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
29. Id. at 439.
30. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983)
(quoting Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434).
31. Levine, supra note 19, at 931.
32. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
33. Id. at 508–09 (quoting E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945)).
34. E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945).
35. Id. at 233.
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Following the New Deal’s balancing test that favored state
action, the Contract Clause’s continued vitality was held in doubt.
Indeed, only one time in the thirty-seven years from 1940 until 1977
did the Supreme Court find state action unconstitutional as violating
the Contract Clause.36 Leading contemporary constitutional
commentators argued that “the clause [was] of negligible importance,
and might well be stricken from the Constitution.”37 Some have
argued that the emergence of Due Process Clause jurisprudence led
to the same results as “if the [C]ontract [C]lause were dropped out of
the Constitution, and the challenged statutes all judged as reasonable
or unreasonable deprivations of property.”38
The late 1970s brought a pair of cases, United States Trust Co. of
New York v. New Jersey39 and Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus,40 that revitalized the Clause’s utility in constitutional
argumentation.41 In United States Trust Co., the states of New York
and New Jersey passed legislation repealing a statutory covenant,
which had the effect of modifying the terms of certain bonds.42 The
Court found for the bondholders on Contract Clause grounds43 and
articulated the modern test for judicial review of Contract Clause
cases involving public contracts: whether an impairment to a contract
is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.44
This test was a departure from Blaisdell’s balancing test, that the
police power of a state would sustain state action if that action was
addressed “to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable
and appropriate to that end.”45 Not only would state actions need to
serve an important purpose but the methods used would now need to
be both reasonable and necessary to achieve that purpose.
Over time, the United States Trust Co. test has been articulated
as a three-pronged analysis, wherein courts inquire “(1) whether a
contractual obligation is present, (2) whether the state’s actions
36. Levine, supra note 19, at 938 n.75. That case was Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362,
369 (1941).
37. HAROLD W. CHASE & CRAIG R. DUCAT, EDWARD S. CORWIN’S THE
CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 105 (13th ed. 1973).
38. Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 852, 890–91 (1944).
39. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
40. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
41. See Jordan Bleznick, Comment, Revival of the Contract Clause, 39 OHIO ST. L.J.
195, 195 (1978).
42. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 9–10, 14.
43. Id. at 32.
44. See id. at 25.
45. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934).
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impaired that contract, and (3) whether the impairment was
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”46
The United States Trust Co. Court found a state was not “completely
free to consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on par
with other policy alternatives” the state was considering.47
The United States Trust Co. case involved state bonds sold with a
particular covenant, which the state had retroactively repealed years
later to free money for other purposes. Reciting the facts, the Court
noted that the covenant’s purpose was to invoke the Contract Clause
as a security against repeal for the bondholders.48 In this context, the
Court analyzed the differences between a state action affecting
private contracts and those actions that impaired the obligations of a
state’s own contracts. The Court found a different basis for reserved
police power arguments when the state affected its own contracts, as
the state’s self-interest was at stake.49 The United States Trust Co.
Court noted that a state’s own contracts would face greater judicial
scrutiny under the Contract Clause than would laws regulating
contractual relationships between private parties.50 To this point, the
Court wrote,
A governmental entity can always find a use for extra money,
especially when taxes do not have to be raised. If a State could
reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the
money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the
Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.51
In United States Trust Co., the Court had the opportunity to read
the Contract Clause out of the Constitution. It chose not to do so.
Instead, the Court noted that the Contract Clause exists and limits
state action.52 In 1978, a second Supreme Court case, Allied, made it
even more clear: “the Contract Clause remains part of the
Constitution. It is not a dead letter.”53

46. Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 141, 500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (1998) (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of
N.Y., 431 U.S. 1, 17–32); see also Gen. Motors v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992)
(inquiring “whether the impairment [was] substantial,” as required by the third prong).
47. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 30–31.
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 25–26.
50. See id. at 22–26.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 16 (noting that case law does not indicate that “the Contract Clause [is]
without meaning in modern constitutional jurisprudence, or that its limitation on state
power [is] illusory”).
53. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978).
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In Allied, the Court wrestled with a Minnesota law that affected
employee pension plans and associated fees. The Court noted that the
“severity of the impairment” to the contractual obligations “measures
the height of the hurdle the state legislature must clear.”54 In
evaluating the application of the Contract Clause to modern times
after United States Trust Co., the Allied Court noted that “[i]f the
Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all . . . it must be
understood to impose some limits upon the power of a State to
abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its
otherwise legitimate police power.”55 Whereas United States Trust Co.
evaluated the impairment of a contract with the state, Allied extended
the Court’s revitalized Contract Clause standards to private
contracts.56 After United States Trust Co. and Allied, the Contract
Clause serves as a limitation on states when they enact new
legislation, even when a statute details its intended benefits to
society.57
Today, United States Trust Co. and Allied guide modern jurists
and litigants in assessing whether state actions violate the prohibitions
of the Contract Clause.58 Even so, the utilization and relevance of
Contract Clause jurisprudence remains far less common today than in
its nineteenth century heyday. For example, cases involving public
employees have more commonly utilized due process arguments
rather than the Contract Clause.59 The use of Contract Clause
jurisprudence regarding public employees has been relatively rare
compared to arguments relating to due process rights.60 Between the
United States Trust Co. decision in 1977 and 1990, the Supreme Court

54. Id. at 245.
55. Id. at 242.
56. See Petersen, supra note 24, at 518.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Schs., 876 F.3d 926, 932 (7th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2624 (2018) (mem.); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Melin, 853
F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 2017), rev’d sub nom. Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018); Nev.
Emps. Ass’n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1990). See generally Ely, supra note
15, at 241–45 (describing the Contract Clause within a more recent context).
59. See Recent Case, North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. State, No. 13 CVS
16240, 2014 WL 4952101 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 5, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 995, 997–98
(“Although the Supreme Court has more commonly analyzed tenure rights through the
lens of due process, New Deal–era precedent recognizes that constitutionally protected
contractual rights may inhere in the legislative grant of teacher tenure.” (footnote
omitted)).
60. See id.
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did not examine the constitutionality of a public contract under the
Contract Clause.61
However, several more modern cases at the intermediate
appellate court level have attacked state actions on Contract Clause
grounds. One case in the Fourth Circuit involved a teachers’ union in
Baltimore that alleged that a new furlough program resulting in salary
reductions violated the Contract Clause as an impermissible
impairment of their contracts with the city.62 The Fourth Circuit ruled
that the augmentations to the teachers’ contracts did not violate the
Contract Clause given the necessity due to the city’s fiscal
circumstances at that time. The Fourth Circuit panel went so far as to
note that the judiciary may not be the proper forum for such a
challenge:
The authority of the states to impair contracts, to be sure, must
be constrained in some meaningful way. The Contract Clause,
however, does not require the courts—even where public
contracts have been impaired—to sit as superlegislatures,
determining, for example, whether it would have been more
appropriate instead for Baltimore to close its schools for a
week, an option actually considered but rejected, or to reduce
funding to the arts, as appellees argue should have been done.
Not only are we ill-equipped even to consider the evidence that
would be relevant to such conflicting policy alternatives; we
have no objective standards against which to assess the merit of
the multitude of alternatives.63
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit panel noted that the circumstances
of public employees were unique and the terms of their public
employment may need to change during certain times. The court
ruled that: “[p]ublic employees—federal or state—by definition serve
the public and their expectations are necessarily defined, at least in
part, by the public interest.”64

61. Nev. Emps. Ass’n, 903 F.2d at 1226 (“The Supreme Court has not examined the
constitutionality of a state law which impairs a public contract since Trust Co.”).
62. Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993).
63. Id. at 1021–22. But see Mass. Cmty. Coll. v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 716
(Mass. 1995) (finding that unpaid furloughs for certain state employees violated the
Contract Clause); Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), 609 A.2d 1204, 1211 (N.H. 1992)
(“[T]he state cannot resort to contract violations to solve its financial problems.”).
64. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021 (“It should not be wholly unexpected,
therefore, that these public servants might well be called upon to sacrifice first when the
public interest demands sacrifice.”).
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In 1997, the First Circuit heard a challenge from Maine public
school teachers relating to alterations to the state’s public pensions.65
The circuit court reversed the district court’s finding of a Contract
Clause violation, reasoning that the Contract Clause required clear
and unmistakable evidence that the state intended to bind itself
contractually, using the aptly named “unmistakability doctrine” of
Contract Clause jurisprudence.66 The panel ruled that “[a]s Contract
Clause challenges arise,” courts must look to the language of statutes
“to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the unmistakability
doctrine is satisfied.”67
Before the Second Circuit, a teachers’ union in Buffalo attacked
state actions passed in relation to the city’s fiscal crisis, including a
wage freeze that had the effect of nullifying a two percent wage
increase that the unions had negotiated as part of their labor contracts
with the city.68 The court found that the temporary wage freeze
satisfied the three-prong test, as it was both necessary and reasonable
to achieve the important public purpose of stabilizing Buffalo’s
precarious fiscal position, particularly because of the prospective and
temporary nature of the wage freeze.69
In a case from the Ninth Circuit, public employees in Hawaii
challenged a statute that would enable the state to postpone the
issuance of their paychecks by a few days.70 In conducting a Contract
Clause analysis at the preliminary injunction stage, the panel found in
favor of the public employees, reasoning that the state’s interference
with the public employees’ contractual rights to prompt payment
were substantial.71 The court reminded the state that the public
employee plaintiffs were “wage earners, not volunteers” and had a
“right to rely on the timely receipt of their paychecks.”72
The above review is not intended as a comprehensive treatment
of all cases arising under the Contract Clause across the country since
the nation’s founding. Instead, it is meant to provide historical and
65. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997).
66. Id. at 5 (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17–18 n.14 (noting
that a statute may be treated as a binding contract “when the language and the
circumstances evince a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature
enforceable against the state”)).
67. Id. at 9.
68. See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 367 (2d Cir. 2006).
69. See id. at 371–72.
70. Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999).
71. See id. at 1106.
72. Id. (“Even a brief delay in getting paid can cause financial embarrassment and
displacement of varying degrees of magnitude.”).
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legal context to the Supreme Court North Carolina’s decision in
NCAE v. State. In that case, the state supreme court found itself with
a challenge to state action that would have retroactively revoked
tenure, also known as “career status,” for teachers.
II. APPLYING THE CONTRACT CLAUSE—NCAE V. STATE
The NCAE litigation provides a clear example of the modern
salience of the Contract Clause: state action affecting the rights of
parties to contracts with the state. Specifically, the plaintiffs
challenged a state law repealing tenured status for those that had
obtained this protected classification. In effect, the case may “give
pause to those seeking to eliminate tenure in any respect.”73 As such,
the reasoning of each layer of judicial review is important to more
fully appreciate the relevance of the case to other public employees in
the state and around the country.
In June 2014, Judge Robert H. Hobgood ruled, inter alia, that
the repeal of the Career Status Law violated the Contract Clause.74 In
June 2015, the North Carolina intermediate appellate court upheld
the ruling.75 In April 2016, the state supreme court again upheld the
trial court’s decision on Contract Clause grounds, effectively
demonstrating that the Clause is far from a dead letter.76
A. Trial Court Ruling
The NCAE teachers first brought their challenge in Wake
County trial court, where the judge applied United States Trust Co.’s
three-prong test and determined that the repeal of teacher tenure for
career status teachers was unconstitutional, as it upset protected
contract rights. As noted above, courts utilizing the United States
Trust Co. test must consider “(1) whether a contractual obligation is
present, (2) whether the state’s actions impaired that contract, and (3)

73. Recent Case, supra note 59, at 1001.
74. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, No. 13 CVS 16240, 2014 WL 4952101, at *5,
(N.C. Super. Ct. June 6, 2014). The trial court also examined a provision by which teachers
were incentivized to voluntarily relinquish their career status, which was determined to be
inseparable from the revocation of career status itself. It was struck down as violative of
the constitutional vagueness doctrine as it “provide[d] no discernible, workable standards
to guide local school districts in its implementation.” Id. As this so-called “25% Provision”
was deemed inseparable from the repeal of career status, this paper will focus on the
revocation of career status. Id.
75. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 241 N.C. App. 284, 305, 776 S.E.2d 1, 16 (2015).
76. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 792, 786 S.E.2d 255, 266 (2016).
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whether the impairment was reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose.”77
In its application of the three-pronged United States Trust Co.
test, the trial court first found that the teachers who had earned
career status prior to Career Status Repeal on July 26, 2013 “have
contractual rights in that status and to the protections established by
the Career Status Law.”78 Next, the trial court found that the state’s
actions had the effect of eliminating the law’s contractual protections
and, therefore, “substantially impair[ed] the contractual rights of
career status teachers.”79 Finally, the court concluded that the
impairment of these contractual rights “was not reasonable and
necessary to serve an important public purpose.”80 The trial court was
particularly clear, writing that “[e]ven if there was an actual need for
school administrators to have greater latitude to dismiss ineffective
career status teachers, that objective could have been accomplished
through less drastic means, such as by amending the grounds for
dismissing teachers for performance-related reasons.”81
The trial court’s reasoning was straightforward: the teachers
accepted the terms of their contracts when they accepted their jobs.
These terms included the employee benefit for career status eligibility
and became part of the offer of employment, on which the teachers
relied when they accepted the terms.82 The judge therefore found that
the state action interfered with the terms of the contract for those
teachers whose rights had vested.
The trial court also examined the state’s law of the land provision
as an independent additional ground for its ruling.83 This provision
operates similarly to a takings claim and represents a more
conventional due process-based argument.84 Under the law of the
land clause of the North Carolina Constitution, the state is not able to
deprive individuals of their property except by the “law of the land.”85
North Carolina courts have interpreted this state constitutional clause
77. Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 141, 500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (1998) (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of
N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17–32 (1997)).
78. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 2014 WL 4952101, at *4.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *5.
82. Id. at *4.
83. Id. at *5 (“Contract rights, including those created by statute, constitute property
rights that are within the Law of the Land Clause’s guarantee against uncompensated
takings.”).
84. See Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 195–96, 293 S.E.2d 101, 107–08 (1982).
85. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be . . . in any manner deprived of his . . .
property, but by the law of the land.”).
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as prohibiting government takings of property without just
compensation.86 Additionally, North Carolina courts have ruled that
government takings of property also provide procedural protections
of private rights against the lawmaking power of the legislature.87
Here, the trial court found that the contractual rights of career
teachers constituted property that could not be “taken” by the state
without just compensation.88
Indeed, Bailey v. State’s law of the land test provided a strong
foundation for the trial court’s determination of both prongs of its
takings analysis.89 The court cited Bailey to support its ruling that
career status teachers had vested property rights in their public
employment contracts. In doing so, the court considered: (a) whether
there was a property right involved and (b) whether that property
right had been subject to a government taking without just
compensation.90
Relying on Bailey, the trial judge distinguished the contractual
rights of career status teachers with those who had not yet achieved
career status.91 Bailey analyzed the state’s retirement benefit
programs that had been in place for state and local employees from
1939 to 1989. Inter alia, the state legislature in 1989 changed a
taxation exemption for retirement benefits from one that was
unlimited to one that had a maximum of $4000 on annual benefits
that would be exempted from state taxation.92 The Bailey court
examined the contractual rights of the public employees and found
that the contractual right to rely on the terms of the retirement plan
existed at the moment at which the retirement benefit rights vested.93
Accordingly, the Bailey court determined that all public employees
whose retirement benefits had vested prior to the enactment of the
86. See Long, 306 N.C. at 195–96, 293 S.E.2d at 107–08.
87. Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 142–43, 500 S.E.2d 54, 61 (1998) (citing Trs. of the
Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58, 88 (1805)).
88. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 2014 WL 4952101, at *5.
89. Id. (citing Bailey, 348 N.C. at 154, 500 S.E.2d at 68).
90. Id. The fact that the career status was not referred to as a “contract” does not
control the case, as the career status rights could be expressed as contractual rights
without the explicit word “contract” being used. See Recent Case, supra note 59, at 999
n.41.
91. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 2014 WL 4952101, at *5.
92. Bailey, 348 N.C. at 139, 500 S.E.2d at 59.
93. Id. at 141–42, 500 S.E.2d at 60–61 (citing Simpson v. N.C. Local Gov’t Emps. Ret.
Sys., 88 N.C. App. 218, 223–24, 345 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1987)); see also Faulkenbury v.
Teachers’ and State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 345 N.C. 683, 690, 483 S.E.2d 422, 427 (1997)
(affirming Bailey’s reliance on the principal that “the relation between the employees and
the governmental units [is] contractual”).
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1989 cap must be exempt from the state tax, regardless of whether the
benefits would be attributable to work prior to or after the 1989
enactment.94 The tax exemption had become a term or condition of
the retirement system to which the public employees had a
contractual right.95 In articulating the relationship between the law of
the land and contract rights, the Bailey court found that “[t]he basis of
the contractual relationship determinations in these and related cases
is the principle that where a party in entering an obligation relies on
the State, he or she obtains vested rights that cannot be diminished by
subsequent state action.”96
Applying Bailey to the instant case, the trial court found that
contract-based property rights vested upon obtaining career status.97
As such, the court denied standing to teachers who were currently in
their probationary periods and had not yet achieved career status.98
For plaintiff-teachers who had achieved career status, the court held
that their rights had vested and the repeal of the career status
constituted a taking without compensation.99
B.

Court of Appeals’ Majority Opinion

The trial court’s decision was appealed to the North Carolina
Court of Appeals on both of its independent grounds: first, that the
repeal of Career Status violated both the Contracts Clause of the
United States Constitution and, second, that repeal violated the law
of the land clause of the state constitution.100 Two appellate judges
upheld the trial court ruling, with the third concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
The appellate court, reviewing the matter de novo, dutifully
applied the United States Trust Co. test.101 The appellate court first
examined whether contractual obligations existed between the
teachers and the state.102 Inter alia, the state argued that previous
federal and state precedent was distinguishable and that it would be
more appropriate to consider the individual teacher’s contracts with

94. Bailey, 348 N.C. at 142, 500 S.E.2d at 61.
95. Id. at 146, 500 S.E.2d at 63.
96. Id. at 144, 500 S.E.2d at 62.
97. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, No. 13 CVS 16240, 2014 WL 4952101, at *4,
(N.C. Super. Ct. June 6, 2014).
98. Id. at *5.
99. Id.
100. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 241 N.C. App. 284, 286, 776 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2015).
101. See id. at 293, 776 S.E.2d at 8–9.
102. See id. at 294, 776 S.E.2d at 9.
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the individual school districts rather than with the state itself.103 In
short, a teacher was not contracting with the state when he or she
obtained tenure; instead, the vested contract right existed between
the teacher and the individual school district. The court of appeals
called
this
approach
“totally
baseless”104
and
“wholly
105
unpersuasive.” In addition to federal and state precedent dating
back to 1938,106 the court relied upon the Supreme Court of North
Carolina’s more recent ruling in Wiggs v. Edgecombe County.107
In Wiggs, a county law enforcement official retired early after
decades of service and received a “special separation allowance”
under state law.108 Subsequently, he took up part-time employment
working as a police officer at a local airport.109 The county reacted to
this news by passing a retroactive resolution that would curtail
“special separation allowances” when a retiree obtained employment
with another local government entity.110 Relying on the Contract
Clause, the Wiggs court held that the county did not have authority to
pass a retroactive restriction that would apply to a vested contractual
right.111
According to the court of appeals in NCAE, the public school
teachers were similarly situated to Officer Wiggs. Both cases
demonstrated the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s “long-standing
recognition that when the General Assembly revokes valuable
employment benefits that are obtained in reliance on a statute and
that offset the relatively low salaries of public employees, it violates
the Contract Clause.”112
In reaching its conclusion on the first prong of the United States
Trust Co. standard, the court of appeals buffeted its reasoning with
policy arguments arising from labor economics.113 According to the

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 299, 776 S.E.2d at 12.
106. Id. (rejecting the State’s attempt to distinguish the North Carolina Career Law
statute from the statute at issue in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938)).
107. Id. at 296, 776 S.E.2d at 10 (citing Wiggs v. Edgecombe Cty., 361 N.C. 318, 324,
643 S.E.2d 904, 908 (2007)).
108. Wiggs v. Edgecombe Cty., 361 N.C. 318, 319, 643 S.E.2d 904, 905 (2007).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 324, 643 S.E.2d at 908.
112. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 297, 776 S.E.2d at 10.
113. Id. at 297–98, 776 S.E.2d at 10–11. Indeed, the NCAE court devoted over a full
page of its ruling to an extended quote from a labor economist, who noted that teachers’
salaries make career status protections more valuable than they otherwise would be, as
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court, the career status served as a statutory promise upon which the
teacher relied as an inducement to enter public employment and
remain in the low-paying position.114 In doing so, the state benefited
from experienced teachers, and the teachers benefited from this
valuable employment protection.
With regard to United States Trust Co.’s second prong, the court
of appeals similarly found for the public school teachers, calling it
“not a difficult question.”115 For the court, the impact upon the
contractual obligation was obvious from the facts: under the career
status provision, the plaintiff-teachers would have continuing
contracts, whereas the career status repeal would limit these contracts
to a maximum of four years.116 Once a contractual obligation is
recognized, North Carolina precedent appears to favor a finding of
substantial impairment in the areas of both retirement benefits, like in
Bailey,117 and additional payments, like in Wiggs.118
The State argued that the career status was merely a contract
modification and that the plaintiffs should have lodged a breach of
contract claim. Even if the contract was impaired, the State argued,
the modification was not a significant impairment.119 In support, the
State pointed to a recent Fourth Circuit case that upheld a city’s
modification of its pension plan from a variable benefit to a cost-ofliving adjustment under applicable state law contract doctrine.120 The
court of appeals was unpersuaded, noting that the authority cited by
the State was “misconstrue[d]” and “not even remotely applicable to
the present facts.”121 Indeed, the court found that the authority upon
which the State relied: (a) heavily tracked another state’s controlling
law and (b) misconstrued the basis for a Contract Clause claim.122
The State had the burden of establishing the third prong,
specifically that the career status repeal was reasonable and necessary

teachers are underpaid relative to comparable positions and receive only minor raises
during the first several years of teaching. Id.
114. Id. at 298–99, 776 S.E.2d at 12 (“We therefore conclude further that, as in
Faulkenbury, Bailey, and Wiggs, the State has reaped benefits by using the Career Status
Law as an inducement by which to attract and retain public school teachers in spite of the
relatively low wages it pays them.”).
115. Id. at 301, 776 S.E.2d at 13.
116. Id.
117. See Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 141, 500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (1998).
118. See Wiggs v. Edgecombe Cty., 361 N.C. 318, 319, 643 S.E.2d 904, 905 (2007).
119. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 301, 776 S.E.2d at 13.
120. Id. (citing Cherry v. Mayor of Balt., 762 F.3d 366, 369–74 (4th Cir. 2014)).
121. Id. at 301–02, 776 S.E.2d at 13–14.
122. Id.
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for an important public purpose.123 While the state has some
deference in determining what is reasonable and necessary,124
complete deference would be inappropriate given that the state’s selfinterest is directly implicated.125 In this case, the State argued that the
dismissal of ineffective teachers would improve the educational
experience for all public school teachers and would further the North
Carolina constitutional guarantee of a right to “the privilege of
education.”126 According to the State, repealing career status would
give local school boards more flexibility in managing their pool of
available teachers and increase the quality of teachers within that
pool.127 The court of appeals was unsympathetic to this argument,128
finding ample ability to dismiss underperforming teachers during the
probationary period and in the Career Status Law itself.129
While the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the repeal
of career status for public school teachers “serve[d] no public purpose
whatsoever,”130 the court was unpersuaded that even if it did advance
a public purpose, the State did not carry its burden to demonstrate
that the repeal was reasonable and necessary to forward that
purpose.131 The court of appeals compared the reasonability and
necessity of the repeal of teacher tenure with those of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina’s prior cases, Faulkenbury v. Teachers’ and
State Employees Retirement System132 and Bailey.133 In those prior
cases, the state supreme court rejected the State’s arguments that the
abrogation of contractual rights was reasonable and necessary even if
the public purpose was legitimate.134 In addition to analyzing state
123. Id. at 302, 776 S.E.2d at 14.
124. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–13
(1983) (“[C]ourts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of a particular measure.” (quoting U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 23 (1977))).
125. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977).
126. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 302, 776 S.E.2d at 14 (quoting N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 15).
127. Id. at 302–03, 776 S.E.2d at 14.
128. Id. at 303, 776 S.E.2d at 14–15.
129. See id. at 303, 776 S.E.2d at 14 (permitting school districts to dismiss career status
teachers for “inadequate performance,” defined as “the failure to perform at a proficient
level on any standard of the evaluation instrument” or “otherwise performing in a manner
that is below standard” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325(e)(1), (3) (2017))).
130. Id. at 304, 776 S.E.2d at 15.
131. Id.
132. 345 N.C. 683, 483 S.E.2d 422 (1997).
133. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 304, 776 S.E.2d at 15.
134. See Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 152, 500 S.E.2d 54, 66–67 (1998) (capping taxexempt retirement benefits); Faulkenbury, 345 N.C. at 693–94, 483 S.E.2d at 429
(correcting the operation of the state pension plan).
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precedent, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in the instant case
also found that: (a) less drastic alternatives were available to the state
and (b) reforms to the teacher hiring and retention system could have
been more targeted to the public purpose had it been necessary for
local school boards to obtain greater flexibility in their hiring.135
The court also examined the independent law of the land basis
for the trial court’s determination. Inter alia, the State argued that it
complied with the law of the land clause by articulating a legitimate
government purpose and that the statute was rationally related to that
purpose.136 Further, the State argued that the act of the state
legislature should be given deference due to a presumption of
constitutionality and that, even then, the argument should be settled
in the legislature rather than the courts.137
The appellate court largely dismissed the State’s cited case
authority as “wholly misplaced” because the case upon which the
State heavily relied did not involve a takings claim.138 Instead, the
court of appeals focused on Bailey’s law of the land standard. The
logic the court utilized was straightforward and focused on the
similarities between the plaintiffs in Bailey and those in the present
case:
Here, as in Bailey, Plaintiffs contracted, as consideration for
their employment, that after fulfilling the Career Status Law’s
requirements, they would be entitled to career status
protections. Here, as in Bailey, the Career Status Repeal
purports to abrogate those protections and thus constitutes a
taking of Plaintiffs’ private property. Here, as in Bailey, the
Career Status Repeal offers no compensation for this taking.
Thus, here, as in Bailey, the Career Status Repeal violates the
Law of the Land Clause.139
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the repeal of career
status for public school teachers violated the state constitution’s law
of the land provision in addition to the Contract Clause, finding each
as a separate and independent basis for its decision.140

135. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 305, 776 S.E.2d at 15–16.
136. Id. at 306, 776 S.E.2d at 16–17.
137. Id. at 306–07, 776 S.E.2d at 17.
138. Id. at 307, 776 S.E.2d at 17.
139. Id. at 308, 776 S.E.2d at 17–18.
140. Id. at 308–09, 776 S.E.2d at 17–18. The State also lodged an argument alleging a
violation of state civil procedure. The majority found this argument “without merit.” Id. at
309–11, 776 S.E.2d at 18–19.
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Court of Appeals’ Dissent

The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Chris Dillon, concurred
in part and dissented in part. Judge Dillon concurred with the
majority that (a) probationary teachers who had not achieved career
status lacked standing and (b) the career-status teachers had a
constitutionally protected property interest in their continued public
employment. For Judge Dillon, the law was unconstitutional to the
extent that it allowed a school board to deprive a teacher of his or her
property interest without a hearing.141
Judge Dillon emphasized the deference given by the courts to
acts of legislation, specifically the presumption of a statute’s
constitutionality.142 With this presumption, Judge Dillon distinguished
an individual teacher’s property right from a contractual right.143 He
cited two United States Supreme Court cases from 1937 to support
this distinction.144 In Judge Dillon’s reading, these cases established a
rule that legislation is presumed not to create private contractual
rights but, instead, to declare the policy of the state.145
Judge Dillon relied heavily upon Phelps v. Board of Education146
in rendering his decision.147 In that case, a New Jersey teacher tenure
law prohibited a local school board from reducing teacher salaries or
discharge without cause after three years of service.148 The Phelps
Court found that the state law did not become a term of the contracts
under which the public school teachers were employed.149 Instead, the
state law limiting teacher tenure regulated the conduct of the local
school board as an entity of the state.150 As characterized recently
elsewhere, Phelps stands for the proposition that laws creating
regulatory rights might not create contract rights subject to the

141. Id. at 319, 776 S.E.2d at 25 (Dillon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 320, 776 S.E.2d at 25.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 320–21, 776 S.E.2d at 25 (first citing Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79
(1937), then citing Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)).
145. Id. at 320–21, 776 S.E.2d at 25–26.
146. 300 U.S. 319 (1937).
147. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 321, 776 S.E.2 at 26 (Dillon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. See Phelps, 300 U.S. at 323.
149. Id.
150. Id. (“Although the act of 1909 prohibited the board, a creature of the state, from
reducing the teacher’s salary or discharging him without cause, we agree with the courts
below that this was but a regulation of the conduct of the board and not a term of a
continuing contract of indefinite duration with the individual teacher.”).
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Contract Clause.151 Applying the Phelps holding to the North
Carolina law, Judge Dillon suggested Phelps would control the
determination and that the Career Status Law created a legislative
status, not a private contractual right, for teachers.152 In support of his
conclusion, Judge Dillon cited the supreme courts of nine other states
that held that tenure for public employees did not create a
constitutionally protected contract right.153
It is necessary to mention three pertinent details about the
Phelps decision. First, as the majority opinion noted,154 the Phelps
decision and the other 1937 case upon which the dissent is predicated
were not cited by any of the parties before the court at any point
during the litigation.155 Accordingly, the majority considered these
arguments abandoned. Second, the Phelps decision—while not
overruled—was decided prior to United States Trust Co. in 1977.
While it is unclear whether the Phelps decision would play out the
same way if heard after 1977, it should also be noted that the court
distinguished Phelps in a subsequent teacher tenure case in 1938’s
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, upholding an Indiana tenure law.156
In applying Phelps, courts have examined, as a threshold question,
whether contractual rights were created.157 A more nuanced analysis
could have laid out why Phelps applied but Brand did not. Third, the
151. See Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Sch., 876 F.3d 926, 932 (7th Cir.
2017) (“Statutes typically create regulatory rights not subject to the Contract Clause. But
when a legislature uses contractual language that induces public reliance, it can create an
enforceable contract . . . .” (citing Phelps, 300 U.S. at 323)).
152. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 321, 776 S.E.2d at 26 (Dillon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Id. at 321–22, 776 S.E.2d at 26 (citing Proska v. Ariz. State Sch. for the Deaf &
Blind, 74 P.3d 939, 943–44 (Ariz. 2003); Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 808–10 (Conn.
1985); Crawford v. Sadler, 34 So.2d 38, 39 (Fla. 1948); Fumarolo v. Bd. of Educ., 566
N.E.2d 1283, 1306 (Ill. 1990); Munsch v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 3 So.2d 622, 624–25 (La. 1941);
Lapolla v. Bd. of Educ., 26 N.E.2d 807, 807 (N.Y. 1940); Malone v. Hayden, 197 A. 344,
352–53 (Pa. 1938); Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., AFL-CIO v. State, 682 P.2d 869, 872
(Wash. 1984); Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 297 N.W. 383, 386 (Wis. 1941)).
154. See id. at 312, 776 S.E.2d at 20 (majority opinion).
155. Id. In a footnote, Judge Dillon provided a defense for his sua sponte reliance on
Phelps and Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937), noting that neither case was cited in
the litigation. Id. at 321 n.2, 776 S.E.2d at 26 n.2 (Dillon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The majority is troubled by my reliance on Phelps and Dodge since
these cases were not cited or argued by the State. However, the State does argue that the
Repeal does not violate the Contract Clause, and I believe it is appropriate for this Court
to rely on Supreme Court opinions and other legal authority which may be controlling or
relevant in determining the law on a constitutional issue raised by a party.”).
156. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 107 (1938).
157. See, e.g., Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Sch., 876 F.3d 926, 932 (7th
Cir. 2017). The Elliott court noted that legislatures that craft tenure laws that “induce[]
public reliance” can create an enforceable contract subject to the Contract Clause. Id.
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Phelps Court deferred to the courts of individual states about the
determination of contractual rights.158 While Judge Dillon cited that
the supreme courts of other states have ruled against contractual
rights for public school teachers, the majority could not find a North
Carolina teacher tenure case that involved vested contractual rights
that implicated the law of the land clause or the Contract Clause.159
Judge Dillon’s dissent also distinguished teacher tenure rights
from deferred compensation arrangements, such as those in Wiggs
and Faulkenbury.160 Teacher tenure is not “earned” in the same way
as deferred compensation, according to Judge Dillon but instead the
eligibility for the status is provided after four years of service.161 Even
then, the career status is not automatic but must be granted by the
local school board, unlike a pension plan or deferred compensation
arrangement. Judge Dillon pointed to state cases in Washington and
California that purportedly support treating tenure rights differently
than deferred compensation.162
Judge Dillon’s dissent did not explicitly mention the state’s law
of the land clause but instead focused exclusively on the federal
Contract Clause. As a result, Judge Dillon’s opinion addressed only
one of the two grounds that Judge Hobgood had found in declaring
the law unconstitutional. While the court of appeals does apply a de
novo standard of review for orders of summary judgment,163 Judge
Dillon excluded from his reasoning a separate and independent
ground for the trial court’s determination.
D. State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of North Carolina decided the NCAE case
in April 2016.164 At the time of the opinion, the court was facing a
critical and unusual election in November 2016. The court has seven

158. Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 322 (1937) (“[W]here a statute is claimed to
create a contractual right we give weight to the construction of the statute by the courts of
the state.”).
159. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 314, 776 S.E.2d at 21.
160. See id. at 324, 776 S.E.2d at 27–28 (Dillon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
161. See id. at 324, 776 S.E.2d at 28.
162. Id. (citing Washington Fed’n of State Emps., AFL-CIO v. State, 682 P.2d 869, 872
(Wash. 1984) and Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 801–03 (Cal. 1947)).
163. N.C. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d
572, 576 (2008) (“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de
novo.”).
164. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 777, 786 S.E.2d 255, 255 (2016).
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seats, which are all technically non-partisan.165 Even so, judicial
candidates’ party affiliations are known, party endorsements are
solicited, and political ideologies loom large in this politically diverse
state.
At the time of the NCAE opinion, the court was composed of
four Republican members, including Chief Justice Mark Martin.166
Democrats occupied the three remaining seats on the court.167 If a
vote had split solely along party lines, the Republican members of the
court would have prevailed.
In November 2016, Justice Robert Edmunds, a Republican, was
facing reelection.168 In the run-up to the election, the state legislature
changed the state’s supreme court election laws from a contested
process to one where Edmunds would run for “retention.”169 This
retention election would be an up-or-down vote on whether to keep
Justice Edmunds rather than a contested process against other
candidates. When the retention bill was found unconstitutional,
Justice Edmunds faced a challenger for his seat on the court, and he
ultimately lost the seat to Democrat Mike Morgan.170
The conservative political composition of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina at the time made it plausible that the NCAE court
would return a narrowly tailored verdict upholding the repeal of
teacher tenure based on the arguments of Judge Dillon’s dissent. That
said, such a ruling likely would have created a rift in the case law
between the precedent in Wiggs, Faulkenbury, and Bailey. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina would have needed to deftly
distinguish NCAE, the teacher tenure case, from its past precedent or
potentially overturn its prior rulings in order to reach a reversal.171
165. Supreme Court of North Carolina, N.C. CT. SYS., http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/
Appellate/Supreme/ [https://perma.cc/XP3A-Y6HG].
166. Mark D. Martin, N.C. CT. SYS., https://appellate.nccourts.org/Bios/index.php?c
=1&Name=Martin [https://perma.cc/RYR6-SF2Y].
167. See Gary Robertson, Morgan Victory Returns Democratic Majority to NC
Supreme Court, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.citizentimes.com/story/news/2016/11/24/morgan-victory-returns-democratic-majority-ncsupreme-court/94386322/ [https://perma.cc/A3VN-KCSN].
168. Frank Stasio & Laura Pellicer, Bob Edmunds Vies to Maintain Seat in NC
Supreme Court Election, WUNC (Oct. 18, 2016), http://wunc.org/post/bob-edmunds-viesmaintain-seat-nc-supreme-court-election#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/PGH9-TS46].
169. See Anne Blythe, NC Supreme Court Retention Election Law to be Overturned,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/state-politics/article61148607.html [https://perma.cc/5TLT-6BFH].
170. See Robertson, supra note 167.
171. Cf. FUN, Some Nights, on SOME NIGHTS (ATLANTIC 2012) (describing a search
for meaning amid apparent contradictions, asking “Oh, Lord, I’m still not sure what I
stand for. What do I stand for?”).
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It is within this context that the court’s unanimous opinion, as
authored by Justice Edmunds, affirmed the trial court’s opinion that
the career status repeal was unconstitutional on Contract Clause
grounds.172 The court did not reach a decision on the law of the land
claim, finding that the Contract Clause grounds were sufficient.173 Put
differently, the state’s supreme court decided the case in such a way
that it was not solely based on the law of North Carolina but on that
of the United States. In doing so, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina increased the likelihood that other courts across the country
could find its reasoning persuasive when deciding similar cases.
Relatedly, in retelling the case’s procedural posture, the NCAE
court subtly recast the court of appeals’ decision on the law of the
land clause. Concerning the court of appeals’ majority opinion, the
court wrote:
The majority concluded that the trial court correctly found the
repeal of the Career Status Law violated the United States
Constitution’s Contract Clause as to teachers who had already
earned career status at the time of repeal. Based on this
Contract Clause violation, the Court of Appeals further held
that plaintiffs’ contract right was a property interest that was
being unjustly taken away by the repeal without compensation
to plaintiffs, in violation of the Law of the Land Clause of the
North Carolina Constitution.174
A casual glance would miss the important distinction. The court
of appeals did not base its determination on a violation of the
Contract Clause alone. Applying Bailey, the court of appeals found
that the vested contractual right of teachers also represented a
property right, “the uncompensated impairment of which by
subsequent legislation can constitute a taking in violation of the Law
of the Land Clause.”175 While the characterization of the court of
appeals’ decision is not incorrect, it is misleading insofar as it did not
reflect both the trial court’s and the appellate court’s intention that
the law of the land clause violation was a separate and independent

172. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 792–93, 786 S.E.2d. 255, 266
(2016).
173. Id. at 792, 786 S.E.2d at 266 (“Because we hold the repeal is unconstitutional in its
retroactive application based on the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, we
need not address plaintiffs’ alternative claim based on Article I, Section 19 of the North
Carolina Constitution.”).
174. Id. at 785, 786 S.E.2d at 262 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
175. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 241 N.C. App. 284, 307, 776 S.E.2d 1, 17 (2015)
(citing Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 154–55, 500 S.E.2d 54, 68–69 (1998)).
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ground for their decisions. The trial and appellate courts had
conducted both the Contract Clause analysis, as well as a due processbased analysis based on taking property without just compensation.
Applying the United States Trust Co. three-pronged test, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether a contractual
obligation arose from the repealed Career Status Law. The NCAE
court cited Phelps and Dodge, among other cases, to support the
court’s deep reluctance to find a contract created by statute without
compelling supporting evidence.176
At first, the court seemed highly sympathetic to Judge Dillon’s
dissent. It sidestepped the fact that Judge Dillon arrived at the
citations to Phelps and Dodge sua sponte, and it emphasized the
presumption that state laws are constitutional.177 The state supreme
court went so far as to distinguish the case from both Bailey
(concerning retirement benefits) and Faulkenbury (concerning
disability retirement payments), in which the statutes themselves
created the vested career status and featured benefits that had been
earned by service over time.178 By contrast, the public school teachers
in the instant case did not have “vested career status rights at the end
of the probationary period.”179 This may have come as a surprise to
the teachers themselves, who looked to the Career Status Law as
their pathway to tenure. Not so, according to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina. Instead of granting tenure to the teachers, the Career
Status Law was
a regulation of conduct through which local school boards can
exercise their discretion to enter into contracts with teachers for
whom they approve career status. The Career Status Law
contemplates the creation of individual contracts between school
boards and teachers but does not itself establish any benefit
provided to teachers by the State nor create any relationship
between them.180

176. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at 786–87, 786 S.E.2d at 262–63 (“Construing a
statute to create contractual rights in the absence of an expression of unequivocal intent
would be at best ill-advised, binding the hands of future sessions of the legislature and
obstructing or preventing subsequent revisions and repeals.”).
177. See id. at 785–86, 786 S.E.2d at 262 (“This Court presumes that statutes passed by
the General Assembly are constitutional, and duly passed acts will not be struck down
unless found unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citations omitted)).
178. Id. at 788, 786 S.E.2d at 263–64.
179. Id. at 788, 786 S.E.2d at 264.
180. Id. (emphasis added).
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In a clever way, the state supreme court threaded a needle: using
the arguments of Judge Dillon’s dissent, the court nonetheless upheld
the teacher tenure structure. The court concluded that the Career
Status Law did not, in itself, create a vested contractual right but
instead created the framework from which teachers and individual
school boards formed contracts that granted teachers vested rights.181
When those contracts were created, according to the court, the state
legislature “no longer could take away that vested right retroactively
in a way that would substantially impair it.”182
Using both contract law theory and the evidentiary record, the
state supreme court found that the teacher-plaintiffs relied upon the
promise of the career status protections in making their contracts with
their school boards.183 Moreover, the court found that the Career
Status Law did not grant vested contractual rights by itself but was
instead an implied term in the contracts between the teachers and the
school boards upon which the teachers relied.184
Finding that the teachers had contractual rights, the NCAE court
then inquired whether there was a substantial impairment of these
rights.185 Finding that the rights “boiled down to enhanced job
security,” the state supreme court held that the changes were a
substantial impairment of these promised protections, including the
promise of continuing employment and the right to a hearing.186
Following the third prong of United States Trust Co., the court
next turned to whether the substantial impairment of the contractual
right was a reasonable and necessary means of achieving a legitimate
public purpose.187 While the court noted that the burden was on the
State to justify an otherwise unconstitutional impairment of contract,
the NCAE court did note that “[t]he Contract Clause is not meant to
bind the hands of the [s]tate absolutely.”188 Here again, the court
captured the spirit of Judge Dillon’s dissent but ultimately sided with
the teachers.
The State articulated its public policy goal as culling “‘adequate’
but marginal teachers with career status” as part of an overall effort
181. Id. at 789, 786 S.E.2d at 264.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 789–90, 786 S.E.2d at 264.
184. Id. at 789, 786 S.E.2d at 264.
185. Id. at 790, 786 S.E.2d at 265 (“We next move to the second part of a Contract
Clause analysis in which we consider whether the vested rights found above were
substantially impaired.”).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 791, 786 S.E.2d at 265.
188. Id.
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to improve public instruction in the state.189 The NCAE court found
that “no evidence indicate[d] that such a problem existed.”190 Instead,
the evidentiary record and the statute itself demonstrated that
“inadequate performance” provided sufficient grounds for dismissal
even under the Career Status Law.191 Under the United States Trust
Co. test, a state must have a legitimate purpose for the challenged
action. Here, the court was skeptical of the adequacy of the state’s
purpose.
Even if the dismissal of “adequate” teachers had been a
legitimate public purpose, however, the means for doing so must also
be necessary and reasonable under the United States Trust Co. test.192
Referring back to its review of statutory changes in career status for
teachers from 1971 to 2013, the state supreme court found that the
state had considerable alternatives that would be “less sweeping”
than a complete revocation of teacher tenure.193 Accordingly, the
court found that the State failed to meet its burden in demonstrating
why the retroactive repeal of tenure was necessary and reasonable.194
While the court found the repeal unconstitutional on Contract
Clause grounds, it did not address the law of the land claims.195 This
raises both concern and opportunity. The state supreme court’s action
may signal to lower courts that it is acceptable to sever Bailey’s
Contract Clause finding from that of its law of the land holding and
simply rule on one ground rather than two separate and independent
grounds. The diminishment of the law of the land clause from a
separate independent ground in the lower courts to a footnote in the
state supreme court might lead some courts faced with similar
circumstances to conclude that (a) ruling on two grounds is
duplicating effort and would not promote judicial efficiency, and (b) if
one ground is sufficient, then it should be the federal constitutional
ground of the Contract Clause rather than the law of the land’s
takings analysis under Bailey and its progeny.

189. Id. at 791, 786 S.E.2d at 266.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 792, 786 S.E.2d at 266; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325(e)(1), (3)
(2017).
192. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at 791, 786 S.E.2d at 265.
193. Id. at 792, 786 S.E.2d at 266.
194. Id.
195. The court noted that ruling on the law of the land clause was unnecessary as the
Contract Clause was sufficient grounds in itself. Id.
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III. BACKGROUND ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW GENERALLY
Public employees do not simply obtain a job from their
government employer; they may also obtain a constitutionally
protected interest in their property and liberty.196 In arguing for the
professionalization of the administration of public programs, into the
field we now know as public administration, Woodrow Wilson noted
that one of the goals of this new field was to make the business of
government “less unbusinesslike.”197 Wilson regarded public
administration as a field of business, noting that “a body of
thoroughly trained officials” was a “plain business necessity.”198
Scholar Graham Allison once wrote that private and public
management are “at least as different as they are similar, and that the
differences are at least as important as the similarities.”199 One salient
difference between the public and private sectors is the management
of personnel. Allison noted that private-sector managers had greater
latitude and more authority to direct personnel.200 Conversely, Allison
noted that the public-sector managers often “found the civil service
system a much larger constraint on his actions and demand on his
time than he had anticipated.”201
Relevant to the issues presented in NCAE v. State, public-sector
employees can acquire a constitutionally protected right to their
continued public employment; public employees do not simply obtain
a job from their government employer, they may also obtain
constitutionally protected interest in their property and liberty.202 In
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,203 among other cases,
the Supreme Court found that civil servants have constitutional
196. See Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional Relevance of the Employer-Sovereign
Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of Government Employees in Light of the
Public Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 797, 797 (2007); see also MARTI
HOUSER, LISA SALKOVITZ KOHN & GEORGE S. CRISICI, AM. BAR ASS’N, INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT § III (2008), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2008/ac2008/143.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3TT-M3GZ].
197. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 201 (1887).
198. Id. at 216.
199. Graham T. Allison, Public and Private Administrative Leadership: Are They
Fundamentally Alike in All Unimportant Aspects?, in LEADERSHIP AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND
PRACTICE 214, 234 (Thomas J. Sergiovanni & John E. Corbally eds., 1984).
200. Id. at 221.
201. Id. at 232. While Allison’s comparison of the public and private manager is now
several decades old, it continues to provide insight on impressionistic differences between
the management of personnel in the public and private spheres.
202. See Garry, supra note 196, at 799; see also HOUSER ET AL., supra note 196, § III.
203. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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protections in their jobs that necessitate due process procedures.204 In
effect, by taking away a civil servant’s job, an employment matter can
become a takings case. As noted by the Loudermill Court, the
substantial interest in public employees retaining their jobs
outweighed the interest of the state in removing them from their
positions quickly.205
Public school teachers, in particular, are now facing a wave of
challenges across the country to their vested employment protections.
Proposals limiting teacher tenure have been debated in eighteen
states, with two states—Florida and North Carolina—passing laws
that eliminate teacher tenure entirely.206 With over three million
public school teachers nationwide, the ongoing issues facing teachers
in one state can influence what may occur in other states.
Recently, in Vergara v. State,207 a California intermediate
appellate court upheld the state’s teacher tenure law, which provided
tenure to teachers after two years.208 A group of students lodged an
equal protection challenge to the statute.209 Their complaint alleged
that teacher tenure allowed “grossly ineffective” teachers to become
employed and maintain their employment in school systems,
especially disproportionally within those schools affecting students in
minority and economically disadvantaged communities210 The state
appellate court reversed the trial court’s repeal of the statute,211
finding that the students had failed to prove that they were more
likely to be taught by ineffective teachers than any other group of
students.212 The California Supreme Court denied review, letting the
intermediate appellate court’s ruling stand.213
The California appellate court limited its Vergara decision to the
“particular constitutional challenge that plaintiffs decided to bring,”
namely, the rights of students under equal protection theory. This
narrow ruling suggests that other constitutional grounds could have

204. Id. at 542.
205. Id. at 544.
206. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Tenure: How Due Process Protects Teachers and
Students, AM. EDUCATOR, Summer 2015, at 4, https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/ae_
summer2015_kahlenberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZA2-U5KZ].
207. 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
208. Id. at 557–58.
209. Id. at 538.
210. Id. at 539.
211. Id. at 557–58.
212. Id. at 538.
213. Id. at 558.
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led to a different judicial outcome.214 In April 2016, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina decided such a case: NCAE v. State.
Instead of focusing on the rights of students, NCAE v. State
concerned the constitutional rights of teachers.215 Specifically, in 2013,
the North Carolina General Assembly acted to rescind career status
for public school teachers.216 In a separate action, the General
Assembly also enabled county governments to decide whether to
eliminate career status for local tenured employees.217 Previously,
public school teachers and certain public employees could obtain
career status after completing a probationary period.218 Career status
granted government employees certain protections, including
dismissal for cause and due process rights.
IV. BACKGROUND ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW IN NORTH
CAROLINA
As in the vast majority of states, the default employment status
in North Carolina for most workers is “at-will” employment.219 Under
North Carolina law, employment is “terminable at the will of either
party irrespective of the quality of performance by the other party”
unless something else (i.e., a contract) evinces something other than
an at-will relationship.220 In North Carolina, “unless something ‘else’

214. See id. at 557 (noting that a higher number of grossly ineffective teachers “may
not present a problem with policy, but it does not, in itself, give rise to an equal protection
violation”).
215. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 786, 786 S.E.2d 255, 262 (2016).
216. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriation Act, ch. 360, sec.
9.6(a), § 115C-325, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1091 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C325 (2013)).
217. Act of June 29, 2012, ch. 126, sec. 1, § 153A-77(d), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 416, 419
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-77(d) (2017)).
218. An Act to Establish an Orderly System of Employment and Dismissal of Public
School Personnel, ch. 883, sec. 1, § 115-142(c), 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1396, 1396 (repealed
2013).
219. See Diane M. Juffras, Public Employment Law, in COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA, art. 19, at 2 (2007) (“When a North Carolina
employer hires someone, the legal presumption that governs the working relationship is
that the employment is ‘at will.’”); The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule,
NAT’L COUNCIL OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-andemployment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z5VW-5JG7].
220. Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1971). See generally Robert
Joyce, “Employment at Will” vs. “Right to Work”, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L.
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=6957 [https://perma.cc/X9S4-SA43] (providing
an overview of at-will employment in North Carolina).
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protects the employee, his or her status is ‘at will.’”221 At-will
employment status enables employers to dismiss an employee at any
time for any reason, or for no reason, unless there is a specific law
against doing so.222 Under many at-will employment laws, employers
may also alter their employees’ wages, work schedules, benefits, or
paid time off without legal penalty.223 Employees in an at-will
relationship may also terminate their employment at their own
discretion without legal liability.224
While at-will employment is the default, it may be modified by
contract. For example, employees may have an employment contract
with their employer promising that employees may only be
terminated for “just cause.”225 If the employment status is modified
via employment contract, then the employee can move from at-will to
protected employment.
Public employees in North Carolina may also have particular
protections that affect whether they are employed at-will.226 Under
federal jurisprudence, when a public employer grants a public
employee a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to continued
employment, it has created a property interest in that employee’s
“continued [public] employment.”227 Moving a public employee from
at-will to just cause, or similar protections, can create such a property
interest.228
The creation of the property interest in continued public
employment triggers constitutional due process protections. Under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, due process is owed when
governments deprive citizens of property.229 Protected public
employees have three distinct due process requirements: (a) notice to
the employee, (b) an opportunity for the employee to respond, and
(c) a final decision by an impartial decision maker.230 These due
process protections can create additional procedural requirements for
221. Joyce, supra note 220. The four methods discussed in this section, including local
ordinance and employment contracts, can provide this “something else” to create a nonat-will employment relationship in North Carolina.
222. The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 219.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See Joyce, supra note 220.
227. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
228. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985); Howell v.
Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1992).
229. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.
230. Id. at 546; see also Crump v. Bd. of Educ., 326 N.C. 603, 615, 392 S.E.2d 579, 585
(1990) (noting the necessity of an impartial decision maker).
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employers looking to dismiss or discipline protected public employees
compared with those employed at will.
Until recently, North Carolina had at least four methods of
moving public employees from at-will to a protected status: (1)
employment contract; (2) local ordinance; (3) “career status” for
teachers, otherwise known as teacher tenure; and (4) the State
Human Resources Act (“SHRA”). Any of these four methods may
trigger due process protections for public employees in North
Carolina.
A. Employment Contract
At-will employment is the default employment status in North
Carolina.231 A public employer could arrange an employment contract
with a government employee that promised additional protections
beyond the at-will default. In doing so, the protections afforded by
the contract would govern the employment relationship rather than
the default at-will rule.
B.

Local Government Ordinance

The North Carolina legislature has delegated broad authority for
human resources management to the city and county governments.232
Accordingly, city councils or county commissioners may enact an
ordinance giving employees just cause protections.233 If a local
governmental body so chooses, an employee who passes a
probationary period may only be dismissed if the employer can show
good cause.
The method by which a city council or county commission adopts
these protections has important legal ramifications. In North
Carolina, only an ordinance can create a “legitimate claim of
entitlement” to employment, and, therefore, a property interest in the
job requiring due process before dismissal.234 Other methods, such as
inclusion in a personnel manual, are insufficient to create such a legal
protection.235

231.
232.
233.
234.
(1992).
235.
(1990).

Juffras, supra note 219, at 2.
Id.
See Joyce, supra note 220.
Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 281
See Kearney v. Cty. of Durham, 99 N.C. App. 349, 351–52, 393 S.E.2d 129, 130
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Teacher Tenure—Public School Teachers

Beginning in 1971, the North Carolina legislature provided all
public school teachers particular protections regarding the terms of
their dismissal and enumerated the specific reasons for which they
could be terminated.236 After completing a probationary period of
four years, teachers could be granted career status after a vote of the
local school board.237 Upon achieving career status, a teacher could be
dismissed or demoted only for one of the fifteen enumerated
reasons.238 Teachers with such status were also granted procedural
notice and hearing rights.239
In 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the
Career Status Law.240 Inter alia, the new law largely barred any new
candidate from obtaining career status as of August 1, 2013.241 As of
July 1, 2018, the law would revoke the career status of all teachers
who had previously earned the protections associated with teacher
tenure.242 This new system is best described as at-will employment,
given that the renewal decision for each teacher would be at the
discretion of the school board.243
Within months of the repeal of the Career Status Law, the North
Carolina Association of Educators and six public school teachers filed
suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The North Carolina
Association of Educators lobbies on behalf of North Carolina public
school teachers and employees in matters of public policy in the state
legislature.244 The question before the state supreme court was
236. An Act to Establish an Orderly System of Employment and Dismissal of Public
School Personnel, ch. 883, sec. 1, § 115-142(c), 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1396, 1397–98
(repealed 2013).
237. An Act to Modify the Hearing Process Applicable to Probationary Teachers, ch.
326, sec. 1, § 115C-325(c)(1), 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 528, 528 (repealed 2013).
238. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325(e)(1) (2017).
239. An Act to Establish an Orderly System of Employment and Dismissal of Public
School Personnel, sec. 1, § 115-142(c), 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1399–1402.
240. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriation Act of 2013, ch.
360, sec. 9.6(a), § 115C-325, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1091 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-325 (2017)) (“‘Career employee’ as used in this section means an employee who
was awarded career status with that local board as a teacher prior to August 1, 2013.”).
241. Id. sec. 9.6(f).
242. Id. sec. 9.6(b), (j).
243. Id. sec. 9.6 (b), (g).
244. See Will Doran, Is North Carolina’s Biggest Teachers’ Lobby Breaking the Law, or
Being Targeted?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Nov. 24, 2017, 9:00 AM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/under-thedome/article186136258.html [https://perma.cc/2XEH-4CUB]; Who We Are, N.C. ASS’N OF
EDUCATORS, http://www.ncae.org/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/PE33-VQHS]; see also
Setting the Record Straight, N.C. ASS’N OF EDUCATORS, http://www.ncae.org/setting-the-
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whether a state law could remove the career status protections for
current public employees.245
D. The State Human Resources Act & Recent Changes for County
Health Officials
Most county employees are subject to county employment
procedures and are employed under an at-will status.246 Broadly
speaking, these employees may be dismissed, disciplined, or demoted
without just cause.
The SHRA defines the recruitment, selection, and termination of
four county-level functions: public health, mental health, social
services, and emergency management.247 In 1975, the SHRA (then
titled the State Personnel Act) was amended to change the
employment status of employees within the Act’s coverage.248 With
this amendment, career employees under the SHRA were given just
cause protections against discipline and dismissal.249
The just cause protection created a property interest in
continued public employment for career employees at the state and
local levels.250 This property interest necessitated due process for
career employees subject to disciplinary proceedings. This protection
continues to extend to state and local career employees subject to the
Act.251 As a general rule, public employees in county health and social
service departments are employed at the county level but are subject

record-straight/ [https://perma.cc/SC9H-62U6] (“The NCAE is not a union, as it does not
have bargaining rights. North Carolina is a non-union state.”).
245. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 778–79, 786 S.E.2d 255, 257–58
(2016).
246. Juffras, supra note 219, at 2. (“For most city and county employees, there is a
presumption of employment at will, unless the employee proves otherwise.”).
247. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-5(a)(2) (2017). The 1965 version of the State Personnel
Act included employees of local social service, public health, mental health, and civil
defense agencies that received federal funds. State Personnel Act, ch. 640, § 2, 1965 N.C.
Sess. Laws 708, 710 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-5(a)(2) (2017)).
248. Act of June 18, 1975, ch. 667, §§ 8–10, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 809, 810–12 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35(a) (2017)).
249. Id. § 10.
250. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985)
(establishing the standard for a public employee’s property interest in continued public
employment).
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35(a) (2017) (“No career State employee subject to the
North Carolina Human Resources Act shall be discharged, suspended, or demoted for
disciplinary reasons, except for just cause.”).
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to the SHRA and, therefore, may receive career status protections as
tenured employees.252
Once career status employees pass a certain probationary period,
they are subject to the SHRA and its guarantee of just cause dismissal
and due process protections.253 As such, employers must have cause to
terminate their employment or demote them. In addition, career
employees are afforded grievance procedures and impartial review
through an administrative process in Raleigh, the state capital.254
Under a recent legislative act, Session Law 2012-126, county
governments around the state may now opt out of SHRA protections
by choosing to consolidate their human services functions into a new
agency.255 In other words, two or more county agencies could be
combined into a new “consolidated human services agency.”256 While
the law creates a complex array of detailed processes and exceptions,
Session Law 2012-126 enables county commissioners to shut down
one or more county agency entities and create a new agency.
The 2012 law does not provide definitions for certain relevant
terms, and that omission can cause substantial uncertainty. For
example, the term “Human Services” is not defined within the law.
The broad umbrella term “Human Services” could mean that county
leaders might decide to fold a diverse array of previously distinct
function areas into a new consolidated agency. It is understood to
incorporate county public health and social services agencies, but it
may also include other types of services provided by a county, such as
aging, veterans affairs, or transportation.257 Similarly, “consolidated”
and “consolidated human service agency” are also undefined within
the 2012 law.258

252. Aimee Wall, An Update on Recent Changes for Local Human Services Agencies,
COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Apr. 23, 2013), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=
7090 [https://perma.cc/54F9-AXRD].
253. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-1.1, -35(a) (2017) (“No career State employee subject to
the North Carolina Human Resources Act shall be discharged, suspended, or demoted for
disciplinary reasons, except for just cause.”).
254. Id. § 126-35(a).
255. Act of June 29, 2012, ch. 126, sec. 1, § 153A-77, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 416, 419
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-77(d) (2017)).
256. See Wall, supra note 252.
257. According to Wall, local governments have three options to choose from under
the 2012 law. Id. If management chooses one of the two specific options allowing for
consolidation, they are explicitly barred from consolidating certain local management
entities. Id. For example, local management entities that handle mental health, substance
abuse, and developmental disabilities generally cannot be incorporated into a consolidated
human services agency. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-76 (2017).
258. See Wall, supra note 252.
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County consolidation of local government entities can strip
career status employees of their protected status. In many cases, the
consolidation will eliminate one or more current local government
entities. If counties elect to consolidate, under certain procedures,259
the county may close an agency in which the county employees
previously fell under the SHRA’s ambit. Under Session Law 2012126, the employees of the new consolidated human services agency
are not subject to the SHRA unless the county commissioners
explicitly elect to have the SHRA extend to the newly created
agency.260 By creating a new consolidated agency out of two or more
local government agencies, state law dictates that the employees of
the new consolidated agency are not subject to the SHRA.261 The
newly consolidated agency employees would be subject to the SHRA
if, and only if, county commissioners expressly elect to keep the
employees under the SHRA.262 Career status employees of these
now-defunct county agencies, previously covered under the SHRA,
might be moved into these new consolidated agencies and lose their
protected status when they are rehired as employees of a new agency
or not rehired at all. Put simply, state law enables counties to lift
certain workers from SHRA career status protections by transitioning
them into a new consolidated agency wherein they would not have
those protections.
One out of every three counties in North Carolina has
consolidated its county departments, including some of its most
populous counties such as Wake, Buncombe, Guilford, and
Mecklenburg.263 More counties are considering consolidation.
The legal repercussions of moving a local career employee into a
consolidated human services agency subject to at-will human
resources management remain unclear. Doing so may create legal risk
for county governments, particularly after the Supreme Court of
North Carolina’s decision in NCAE v. State, which upheld career
status protections for teachers who had obtained the protected

259. Id.
260. Act of June 29, 2012, sec. 1, § 153A-77(d), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 419; see also
Wall, supra note 252.
261. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-77(a) (2017); see also Wall, supra note 252.
262. § 153A-77(d).
263. Jill D. Moore & Aimee N. Wall, PH and SS Organization and Governance:
Resolutions as of April 2018, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T, https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.
sog.unc.edu/files/CHSA%20map%2004.2018%20v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTT5-8XA3].
Notably, these counties include Raleigh, Asheville, Greensboro, and Charlotte,
respectively.
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status.264 Just as the NCAE litigation could be applied to public school
teachers in other states, the case may also be applicable to this
separate group of public employees in the newly consolidated health
departments.
V. ON THE APPLICATION OF NCAE V. STATE IN NORTH CAROLINA
AND ELSEWHERE
Rather than fashion a holding based on state law principles, the
NCAE court hung its holding on the Contract Clause alone.265 In
doing so, the court increased the likelihood that other courts across
the country may find its reasoning persuasive when deciding similar
cases.
A. Applying the Lessons of NCAE in North Carolina
In North Carolina, another group of public employees, namely
those affected by statutory changes to the SHRA, seem similarly
situated to the public school teachers in the NCAE litigation. Certain
public employees who were previously protected by North Carolina’s
SHRA may lose their protected status after a recent change to state
law. This law enables counties to consolidate their human services
functions into a new agency.266 After this new agency is created,
public employees who had previously obtained career status under
the SHRA could lose that status. In both cases, state law allowed
them to obtain particular employment protections, which once
achieved would remove them from at-will employment status. Recent
state action has had the effect of removing these protections.
Even with the similarities between the two groups of public
employees, four important distinctions remain: (1) the statutory
regime providing the career status; (2) the method by which career
status is removed; (3) whether the career status employee has been
rehired; and (4) the diversity of public employees affected.

264. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 792–93, 786 S.E.2d 255, 266 (2016).
265. Id.
266. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-77(b)–(d) (2017). Before the legislation was enacted, a
county with a population of over 425,000 could elect to create a consolidated human
services agency. Act of May 20, 1987, ch. 217, sec. 1, § 153A-77, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 291,
291, repealed by Act of June 29, 2012, ch. 126, sec. 1, § 153A-77, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 416,
419 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-77 (2017)). The state’s two largest counties—
Wake and Mecklenburg—did just that. See Wall, supra note 252. The legislation removed
the population threshold from that law, which opened the door for all counties to consider
whether they should consolidate. Act of June 29, 2012, sec. 1, § 153A-77, 2012 N.C. Sess.
Laws at 419.
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First, teacher tenure was created under a different statutory
arrangement than the SHRA. While the career status achieved under
the SHRA and the state teacher Career Status Law are similar, they
are distinct laws and provide for distinct process requirements. Both
remove the career status employee from at-will employment but do
so under two distinct statutory regimes with their own legislative
histories. As the two statutory regimes are different, the NCAE
litigation does not directly implicate employees under the SHRA.
Even so, the lessons from the NCAE litigation can inform arguments
and potential future litigation for public employees that have lost
their SHRA protection.
Second, the state legislature created different processes to
remove career status from the two sets of public employees. For
public school teachers, career status was repealed by the state
legislature, and the repeal was set to take place over several years.
For employees under the SHRA, counties have an option to
consolidate their human service entities into a new agency. If they
elect to do so, their default option is to remove the employees from
SHRA protection. In effect, the state law empowers a county
commission to change the structure of its public agencies and decide
whether SHRA protections will flow to the employees of the newly
created agency.
While in both cases a state act has had the effect of removing
public employees from career status, a narrow interpretation could
create distinguishing treatment. In the NCAE litigation, it was clear
that the career status was removed by the state itself. If SHRAapplicable public employees were to litigate their status removal, they
may face the counterargument that the county board—not the state—
was the entity denying the career status. The new agency was
authorized and created by the county board under the Consolidated
Human Services Act, but the decision to apply SHRA protections
was made by the county, not the state.
Even so, the NCAE court’s reasoning may increase the strength
of the SHRA-applicable employee’s case. In NCAE, the Career
Status Law did not grant vesting contractual rights—it was an implied
term in the contracts between school boards and individual teachers,
and the state law created a framework for school boards and teachers
to craft these contracts. Local SHRA-applicable public employees
might argue that the SHRA provided similar background for the
employment contracts between their public employer and themselves.
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As the NCAE court acknowledged,267 the state law allowed for
discretion among local public bodies in making employment
contracts. For SHRA employees, the counties previously had this
discretion in making contracts, and the employees may have relied on
the SHRA as an implied term of their employment contracts. When
they were granted tenure, these public employees would have also
had vested contractual rights which were impaired by the state’s
subsequent action to allow for human service agency consolidation.
Third, the nature of the different processes by which career
status is removed may create confusion about whether the career
status employee has been rehired. After the repeal of North
Carolina’s teacher tenure law, the school district presumably
remained intact. Although individual teachers may have lost an
employment protection, their employer continued to exist. In the case
of a consolidated human services agency, the county could eliminate
an agency as a separate organizational entity and fold it into a newly
created consolidated agency. The career status that a public employee
had previously obtained under the SHRA might not transfer to the
new agency, in part because their previous employer may no longer
exist as an organization.
If the county organization no longer exists, then all employees
might be considered new hires or rehires outside of the SHRA
protections. A court faced with this question could conceivably arrive
at the conclusion that the same worker doing the same task is in the
same job. An alternative conclusion, however, is also reasonable—
namely, the change in the organization’s legal status as an entity could
mean that all employees must be newly hired into the new
organization.
Fourth, teachers are a defined group of public employees while
human services employees are undefined in current North Carolina
law. The SHRA protects the employees of certain county functions,
such as emergency management, health, and social services. Other
county functional areas are not included within the SHRA’s
protections, such as aging, transportation, or veterans affairs.
Counties are free to include a medley of county operations within a
consolidated agency, and many have done so.268 As such, the
employees of the consolidated agency may include those previously

267. See N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at 788–89, 786 S.E.2d at 264.
268. See CHSA Organizational Charts, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T, https://www.sog.unc.edu/
resources/microsites/north-carolina-public-health-law/chsa-organizational-charts [https://perma.cc/
V4JM-8KCG].
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governed by the SHRA as well as those who were not.269
Consequently, human resources policies and ordinances targeting
these consolidated agencies may grant employee protections that
were greater or less than county employees had previously enjoyed.
The legal status of career employees in newly created
consolidated agencies is currently uncertain. Similar to the career
status for public school teachers, the SHRA provided constitutional
property interests and due process to certain state and local
government employees after a probationary period. Local
governments now have an option to remove the career status
protections for many of these SHRA-applicable local government
employees.270 While the NCAE case does not bear directly on these
SHRA-protected local government employees, the legal reasoning is
similar for both public school teachers and public employees affected
by North Carolina’s recent career status repeals at the local
government level. Put another way, the case’s Contract Clause
arguments have broader applicability beyond just the context of the
public school teacher plaintiffs involved.271
Public employees might also consider strategic interventions
outside of litigation. As an alternative option, public employees could
rally and organize to petition their elected representatives to reinstate
their previous employment protections. For example, public
employees could lobby their county commissioners to revisit the
decision to remove SHRA protections. As the state has delegated
decision making on extending SHRA protections to the county level,
each county could make this determination itself for county
employees in newly consolidated human service agencies.
While the situations of public school teachers and that of SHRAapplicable public employees have some distinguishing characteristics,
the situations are comparable enough as to lead to a judicial finding
that they are similarly situated.
The State likely will be better prepared for future challenges to
career status revocation than they were in the NCAE case. In
particular, Judge Dillon’s citation to Phelps and other cases could
269. As noted above, some local management entities that handle certain
responsibilities (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, and developmental disabilities)
cannot be incorporated into a consolidated human services agency under certain
consolidation options in most of North Carolina’s counties. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A76(5)–(7) (2017).
270. See Act of June 29, 2012, sec. 1, § 153A-77, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 419.
271. See, e.g., State of Nev. Emps. Ass’n. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1225, 1228 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding that state legislation unconstitutionally impaired contractual obligations
affecting public employees’—not limited to teachers—pensions).
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provide a roadmap to bolster a defense of state action. Moreover, the
SHRA statute has a different history, calls for different procedures,
and contains different language than the state’s teacher tenure law
and its repeal, enabling courts to potentially distinguish these
characteristics.
Lessons from the NCAE appellate process about relevant
authority likely will lead future litigants to tailor authority to guiding
North Carolina case law, especially the cases of Bailey, Faulkenbury,
and Wiggs. Arguments that distinguish career status employment
protection from the deferred compensation in those cases are likely to
be emphasized in defense of the state action, as they were in Judge
Dillon’s dissent.
Indeed, Judge Dillon, in a unanimous North Carolina Court of
Appeals opinion, recently cited favorably to the supreme court’s
NCAE decision. In a 2016 case involving state magistrates and the
aptly titled “Salary Statute,” the magistrates alleged that they had
been promised future pay increases with a salary step schedule set by
statute.272 Judge Dillon compared the magistrates who were suing
over future changes to their salaries to the teachers in NCAE who
had not yet obtained tenure.273 Ultimately, the court of appeals in that
case found that the state legislature was “free to alter the salary
schedule before the work supporting each [salary] step increase is
performed by a magistrate.”
As demonstrated in the lower levels of the NCAE litigation, the
combination of the state constitution’s law of the land provision in
addition to the Contract Clause appears to provide a potent
combination in support of public employees’ position when protected
contractual rights are threatened by state action. While the United
States Supreme Court has more commonly addressed such cases on
due process grounds,274 NCAE v. State provides a relatively novel
approach to litigating public employment status. Jurists and advocates
in public employment matters in North Carolina and elsewhere may
be interested in adapting and applying such arguments to the facts
before them.
272. Adams v. State, __ N.C. App. __, __, 790 S.E.2d 339, 341 (2016), rev. denied __
N.C. __, 803 S.E.2d 386 (2017).
273. Id. at __, 790 S.E.2d at 343 (“The actions of the General Assembly in suspending
step increases for future work did not take away any benefit already earned by Plaintiffs,
whereas in N.C. Ass’n of Educators, the successful plaintiffs had already worked the
requisite years to earn career status.” (citation omitted)). The Contract Clause reasoning
of NCAE and Adams v. State were also utilized in the unpublished opinion Terry v. State,
No. 14 CVS 12342, 2017 WL 491930, at *4–7 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).
274. Recent Case, supra note 59, at 997.
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Applying the Lessons of NCAE Across the Country

Tenure of public employees is a controversial topic in North
Carolina and across the country. The NCAE litigation provides an
opportunity to separate the politics from the law and focus squarely
on the legal protections afforded to public employees in exchange for
their relatively modest salary and public service.
While the career status of North Carolina teachers and other
public employees has important distinctions, the lessons of the
recently decided NCAE litigation are highly applicable for future
advocates for SHRA-applicable local employees and are persuasive
in other jurisdictions considering similar cases. As noted elsewhere,
the “Contract Clause may . . . provide a shield against lawmakers’
efforts to strip tenured teachers of their tenure rights.”275 In states
that recognize contractual rights in legislative grants of employment
benefits, NCAE demonstrates that the grant of career status—tenure
by another name—creates constitutionally protected contractual
rights.276 As applied to other jurisdictions, the trial court decision and
the court of appeals majority’s policy arguments also offer compelling
reasons in favor of maintaining teacher tenure.277 It would behoove
advocates on both sides of the issue to consider both the legal and
policy arguments advanced at each stage of the NCAE litigation as
these arguments provide a blueprint for future arguments, albeit with
different statutory backgrounds. As noted elsewhere, the complete
elimination of teacher tenure is not the sole means through which the
tenure system might be reformed.278
As a decision of a state’s highest court, the NCAE decision is
particularly persuasive. The decision’s persuasive value increases
when paired with a recent federal case, which came to a similar
conclusion. That case, Elliott v. Board of School Trustees of Madison
Consolidated Schools,279 involved the termination of a tenured school
teacher following state action that affected the way teacher’s
contracts were cancelled.280 At the district court level, the judge noted
that it was undisputed that teacher tenure was a contractual right in
275. Id. at 1002.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. (citing legislative developments in New York and California that would
streamline the process for firing and disciplining teachers accused of misconduct).
279. No. 1:13-cv-319-WTL-DML, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30309 (S.D. Ind. March 12,
2015), aff’d 876 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No.17-1259, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3550
(2018).
280. Id. at *3–6.
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that state but that the parties disagreed as to the scope of that right.
Ultimately, the federal judge ruled in favor of the teacher, finding
that the state’s change to the teacher tenure system was unnecessary
to accomplish the goal of improving teacher quality since adequate
measures already existed to address the state’s concerns.281 The state’s
change was therefore unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff.282
The NCAE decision and the Elliott decision, affirmed in the
Seventh Circuit, are far from the first cases related to public
employment protections and the Contract Clause, and they are
unlikely to be the last. Future litigants and jurists should take heed
that Contract Clause arguments can be both powerful and persuasive.
Given that the NCAE decision interpreted the language of the
Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause, the decision may be
particularly persuasive in other jurisdictions in which the state
constitution’s equivalent to the Contract Clause mirrors the language
of the Federal Constitution. Given that the language that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina interpreted would be mirrored in
the state constitution elsewhere, the other states’ reviewing courts
might find the NCAE court’s reasoning highly persuasive. According
to one recent commentator, “eliminating tenure altogether is
impractical because doing so may violate the Contracts Clause . . .
[b]ecause eliminating tenure effectively eliminates teachers’ rights to
employment contracts that are guaranteed by the constitutions of
both the United States and the individual states . . . .”283 That
commentator went on to conclude that in light of the legal challenges
posed by the Contract Clause, “completely eliminating tenure is not a
viable option for legislatures in future modifications to teacher
tenure.”284 Several state constitutions, including those of Idaho,
Michigan, and Indiana, have contract clause language similar to that
of the Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause.285
281. Id. at *35–36 (first citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
247 (1978) (“[T]here is no showing in the record before us that this severe disruption of
contractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general social problem.”);
then citing U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29–31 (1977) (“[I]t cannot be
said that total repeal of the covenant was essential; a less drastic modification would have
permitted the contemplated plan . . . a State is not free to impose a drastic impairment
when an evident and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally well.”)).
282. Id.
283. Kimberly M. Rippeth, Running the Race: An Evaluation of Post-Race-to-the-Top
Modifications to Teacher Tenure Laws and a Recommendation for Future Legislative
Changes, 50 AKRON L. REV. 141, 161 (2017).
284. Id. at 163.
285. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 16 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed.”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“No
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CONCLUSION
Public employees generally enjoy greater employment
protections in their work than their private-sector counterparts. For
example, the United States Supreme Court in Loudermill established
a constitutionally protected right for public employees in their
continued public employment.286 It is well known that state actions
that interfere with this vested right constitute a government takings
and trigger due process protections. What is comparably rare is the
utilization of Contract Clause-based arguments with regard to public
employment protections.
North Carolina is on the frontlines of an ongoing national debate
about the appropriate level of employment protections for public
employees. As noted above, public managers face comparably greater
constraints in terms of personnel than their private-sector
counterparts.287 Nearly twenty states have proposed weakening
teacher tenure laws, but North Carolina is among the few states that
have passed legislation barring teachers from such protection.
Using a case study of North Carolina public-sector employees in
education and in health departments, this analysis found that the
ongoing debates in North Carolina present lessons for litigants and
jurists across the country. The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s
analysis of the Contract Clause created persuasive precedent for
policymakers and judges in other states to consider when debating
policy options and deciding similar cases in coming years.

ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.”);
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the
obligation of contract shall be enacted.”).
286. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545–46 (1985).
287. Allison, supra note 199, at 221.

